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Abstract. The present study investigates the link between quality of governance and stock market performance within 
the context of international markets. The study employed the Fixed Effect model using 23 countries with complete 
relevant data for the period spanning from 1996 to 2014. The study reveals that, quality of governance as captured by 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption significantly affect stock market performance. Varying effects are produced when 
the countries are decomposed into income classifications. What is more, the findings and suggestions of this study 
suggest that quality of government significantly affect foreign direct investment and could have interesting policy 
implications. The main value of this paper is to examine the link between quality of governance and stock market 
performance within the context of international markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What is the link between quality of governance framework and stock market performance? A 
number of cross-country studies for example, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), 
Bruno and Claessens (2010), among others, have demonstrated that effective functioning of 
any investment activity hinges on good corporate governance mechanisms which in turn 
depend on the quality of governance framework of a country. This is because firms do not 
operate in a vacuum as they are affected by the governance systems in which they operate. 
Empirical evidence has however shown that governance and stock market performance are 
somewhat inextricable. The United States (US) House of Representatives on October 29, 2008 
voted down the bailout bill proposed by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in order to 
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provide extra liquidity to the troubled US financial markets. Global stock markets1 and Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index quickly reacted with an increased by 17 per cent within 
two hours of the announcement. Dow Jones Industrial Average Index dropped 778 points a day 
after indicating clearly that, the uncertainty about the outcome of a critical vote was reflected by 
both domestic and global stocks. This seems to suggest that financial markets do not operate in 
a vacuum as they are affected by the governance systems in which they exist. Studies by Hail 
and Leuz, (2006), Hooper et al., (2009) Chen et al., (2009) Giannetti and Koskinen (2010), 
Chiou et al., (2010) among others have opined that quality of a country’s governance is known 
to be affecting the operation of financial and capital markets. Dooley (1998), McKinnon and Pill 
(1997) confirmed that governments are responsible for financial volatility and financial excesses. 
The novelty of this study over the previous related studies stems from the following grounds: 
first, although several studies had been conducted in the past, the primarily focus had been on 
firm-specific corporate governance and stock market performance. The present study beams a 
searchlight on the country-level governance environment under which firm-specific corporate 
governance is implemented. Second, literature on stock market performance has focused 
mainly on non-governmental factors such as sovereign spreads (Gendreau and Heckman, 
2003), valuation ratios (Campbell and Shiller., 1998; Maroney et al., 2004; Ciaessens et al., 
1998; Groot and Verschoor, 2002), population demographics (Bakshi and Chen, 1994; Bekaert 
et al, 1998), exchange rates (Bailey and Chung, 1995; Harvey, 1995), and inflation rates (Erb et 
al, 1995; Hooker, 2004) as playing a contributory role on stock market performance. As a result, 
this study adds new empirical evidence to the existing stock of knowledge. Third, the sample 
employed in this study comprises of 23 countries with complete relevant data for the period from 
1996 to 2014. The high frequency dataset will ensure that more robust policy recommendations 
are made. Further, country-level governance structures have remarkable informative power 
related to firm-level measures in explaining stock market performance (Krishnamurti et al., 
2005; Doidge et al., 2007; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Finally, country heterogeneity is 
considered as a key relevance of this study. The researchers are of the view that quality of 
governance is possible to differ from country to country, rendering any evidence on return 
predictability country-specific. Hence, this study seeks to develop country-level governance 
indices of 23 countries sampled from high income, upper middle income and lower middle 
income countries, as shown in Table 1, to examine whether country-level governance indicators 
can predict stock market performance and, if so, whether this has implications for investors.  
The study is structured in five sections. Section 2 reviews related literature in the study. 
Section 3 presents the data source and governance indicators. The next section presents the 
study methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 discusses the results 
and recommendations of the study. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 See Gray and Wood (Financial Times, September 30, 2008, p. B7). 
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Table 1. List of countries included in the sample by income classification. 
Classification  Countries Region Sample Period  
High Income(OECD) Australia East Asia & Pacific 1996-2014 
 
Belgium Europe & Central Asia 1996-2014 
 
Canada North America 1996-2014 
 
Germany Europe & Central Asia 1996-2014 
 
Chile Latin America & Caribbean 1996-2014 
 
Israel The Middle East & North Africa 1996-2014 
 
United States North America 1996-2014 
 
United Kingdom Europe & Central Asia 1996-2014 
 
Japan East Asia & Pacific 1996-2014 
Lower Middle Income Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 1996-2014 
 
India South Asia 1996-2014 
 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa 1996-2014 
 
Morocco The Middle East & North Africa 1996-2014 
 
Philippines East Asia & Pacific 1996-2014 
 
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia 1996-2014 
 
Pakistan South Asia 1996-2014 
Upper Middle Income South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 1996-2014 
 
Thailand East Asia & Pacific 1996-2014 
 
Tunisia The Middle East & North Africa 1996-2014 
 
Turkey Europe & Central Asia 1996-2014 
 
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean 1996-2014 
 
China East Asia & Pacific 1996-2014 
  Mexico Latin America & Caribbean 1996-2014 
Source: World Bank data 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The literature on the quality of governance in influencing a country’s stock market performance 
is large and growing in recent times. Recent literature in the early 2000s (see, e.g., La Porta et 
al., 1997, 1998, 2000; Ball et al., 2000; Gul and Qui, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenson, 2002) have 
shifted the focus from firm-specific corporate governance to country-level governance 
environments. It is an undeniable fact that country-level governance has now become an 
important policy issue in many countries. In developed countries for instance USA, Milyo (2012) 
reports that stock markets react to governance indicators and events. Bechtel (2009) argued 
that a stable political situation has a systematic investment risk and encourages growth, capital 
investment and improves overall economy’s performance. Jorion and Geotzmann (1999) 
derived that political events had an interruption in the market transactions. Chiu et al. (2005) 
proved that political elections in South Korea changed the behavior of foreign investors in 
financial markets. Beaulieu et al. (2006), Aktas and Oncu (2006), Bailey et al. (2005) and Frey 
and Waldenstrom (2004) argued that political events had a strong effect on the returns and 
trading volume of the financial markets. Low et al, (2011) found a negative relation between 
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governance quality and equity return when they examined the link between country-level 
governance and global stock market performance. A study by Munteanu and Brezeanu (2014) 
which employs a Prais-Winsten regression that allows for both autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity confirms that government effectiveness and control of corruption present 
significant positive effects on bank performance across emerging European economies. 
Hooper et al, (2009) reveal a significant and positive association between quality of 
governance and stock market performance. Lombardo and Pagano (2000) employ a cross-
section of national stock market indices from both developed and emerging markets and confirm 
the link between quality of governance and the return on equity. Simplice (2011) study reveals a 
direct association between stock market returns and the quality of government institutions. Hail 
& Leuz (2003) concur a significant relationship between the strong legal institution's cost of 
capital. Governments have also been blamed for financial volatility and financial excesses (see, 
for example, Dooley 1998, McKinnon and Pill 1997). Albuquerque and Wang (2008) find that 
high investments are often necessitated by poor investor protection. Such results parallel those 
of Harvey (1995), and of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) with special reference to emerging 
markets. The trustworthiness of governments, the reliability of courts, and the full disclosures of 
accounting standards in the countries of the common law system significantly affect stock 
market returns (Djankov et al., 2003). Li and Filer (2007) concur that countries which attract 
more equity investors often practices unbiased and transparent legal systems. The effects of 
political risk have been found to be statistically significant in emerging stock markets (see, e.g., 
Erb et al., 1996a, Diamonte et al., 1996; Perotti and van Oijen, 2001). Lehkonen and Heimonen 
(2015) employ 49 emerging markets panel data to investigate how stock markets respond to 
changes in democracy and political risk. The study finds evidence to support that stock markets 
respond significantly to changes in democracy and politics. Their results reveal that decline in 
political risk leads to higher returns. Evidence on the negative effects of democracy on the 
volatility of growth is provided by Mobarak (2005). Empirical works by Bittlingmayer (1998), 
Henry (2000), Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Bailey and Chung (1995) confirm that political 
uncertainty significantly affects market volatility. Research work on the US Civil War by Willard 
et al., (1996) discovered that the turning points during the civil war reflected the price of the 
Greenbacks. 
Bailey et al. (2005) examined the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and concluded that 
the impact of political events on the returns affects US-based international equity mutual funds. 
Frey and Waldenstrom (2004) studied the fluctuation in the value of government bonds of 
Germany and Belgium traded in the Zurich and Stockholm markets during Second World War, 
confirmed the relationship between political event and stock market performance. In 1995, a 
referendum conducted in Quebec on the separation from the Canada Federation had a positive 
impact on the stock market performance. This was good news for financial markets because 
Quebec will remain a part of Canadian Federation (Beaulieu et al., 2006). Research by 
Ferguson (2006), which examined the behavior of the London bond market during the First 
World War, revealed a more significant effect on the international bond yield performance. 
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Ismail and Suhardjo (2001) examined the effect of domestic political events on the Jakarta 
Stock market performance. They concluded that the whole market and the overall industry did 
not show any significant response to all events. Chiu et al. (2005) studied the behavior of 
foreign investors in the four elections of South Korea. The results showed that negative 
relationship exists between KOSPI 200 index return and the volume of both future and option 
contracts. Onder and Simga-Mugan (2006) evaluated the impact of economic and political news 
on the emerging markets; the study took a case of two markets the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange (BASE) in Argentina and Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in Turkey. They examined 
political and economic news and financial markets from January 1995 to December 1997. The 
results showed that both economic and political news affects the stock markets. A pioneering 
study by Javed and Ahmed (1999) on the impact of the studies on two nuclear tests in Pakistan 
and India in 1998 and 1999 respectively on Karachi Stock Exchange on trading volume, 
volatility and average return 1995 to 1999 by using the ARCH Model. The study reports that, 
whereas Indian nuclear tests had a significant negative impact on the average rate of returns, 
trading volume and volatility level increased at KSE, Pakistani nuclear tests did not affect the 
average rate of returns significantly. They did, however, increase the volatility and trade volume. 
Masood and Sergi (2008), who used Bayesian modeling and Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
techniques to examine major political events in Pakistan from 1947 to 2006, which had an effect 
on the stock market, find that the Pakistan’s political uncertainty has a risk premium of 7.5 to 12 
percent. Some researchers like Robock (1971), Haendal et al. (1975), Kobrin (1979) and Feils 
(2000) have examined the impact of political risk on the volatility of investment and observed 
both negative and positive effects. 
 However overwhelmingly the literature on the link between quality of governance 
framework and stock market performance has advanced our knowledge, the empirical results 
have been mixed and contradictory, allowing the present study to add new empirical evidence to 
the existing stock of knowledge. First, the previous works have focused mainly on the 
developed and emerging countries for example US and Europe where the impact may differ. 
The study extends the existing literature by examining the link between quality of governance 
framework and stock market performance by grouping these countries into three income 
classifications: Lower Middle Income, Upper Middle Income and High Income. Second, unlike 
the previous studies where few countries have been sampled and selected, the present study 
samples 23 countries with complete relevant data for the period from 1996 to 2014 to examine 
the of impact quality of governance framework on stock market performance. Finally, previous 
studies have shown that the impact of quality of governance framework on stock market 
performance is inconclusive. Whereas some studies have revealed a positive impact on the 
quality of governance and stock market performance, others have confirmed an inverse 
relationship. The inconclusiveness of the previous studies indicates that this problem deserves 
new research. The study therefore hypothesizes the following relationship. 
 
H1: Quality of government significantly affects stock market performance 
Boadi & Amegbe / European Journal of Government and Economics 6(1), 78-101 
83  
 
3. Data source and governance indicators 
 
3.1 Stock returns data 
 
The global equity indices were obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators data 
stream and are broadly representative of each country’s market composition. The equity returns 
indicating market performance were selected from January 1996 to December 2014, which 
correspond to the years that governance data are available. Panel A of Table 2 and Panel A, 
B,C of Table 3 reports both the summary statistics of stock returns and summary statistics of 
stock returns per income classifications from 1996 to 2014. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of stock returns from 1996 to 2014. 
 
Countries 
Credit 
Rating 
Political Risk Index(PRI) with Global 
Index as 73 mean s.d. min max 
Australia AAA 88 9.412 2.651 -5.408 7.237 
Belgium AA 81 9.542 3.132 -6.557 6.383 
Brazil A− 70 1.035 2.564 -4.904 5.753 
Canada AAA 93 1.127 2.696 -4.28 6.403 
Chile AA− 84 8.848 3.511 -4.124 8.399 
China AA− 70 9.269 3.138 -3.468 7.376 
Germany AAA 83 8.347 1.874 -3.848 3.101 
Ghana B 70 5.337 2.026 -4.952 3.525 
India BBB− 70 4.205 2.708 -3.486 5.672 
Israel AA− 82 4.541 3.901 -5.09 9.416 
Japan AA− 85 1.75 4.398 -6.414 9.414 
Mexico A− 80 1.238 3.582 -3.54 1.083 
Morocco BBB 70 6.851 2.612 -1.914 7.853 
Nigeria BB- 59 9.229 3.796 -6.16 7.152 
Pakistan B− 54 1.67 6.368 -8.225 1.703 
Philippines BB+ 73 1.825 3.931 -6.192 1.12 
South Africa A− 69 9.598 3.077 -4.171 5.61 
Thailand BBB+ 76 1.19 5.127 -7.876 1.472 
Tunisia BB- 69 1.911 2.19 -4.702 4.793 
Turkey BB+ 71 3.029 7.848 -6.24 2.545 
Ukraine B- 56 1.717 5.054 -5.717 1.251 
United Kingdom AAA 86 1.471 4.53 -5.27 1.022 
United States AA+ 84 1.559 3.375 -4.507 7.85 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of stock returns per income classifications from 1996 to 2014. 
Market Region mean s.d. min max 
Panel A: Lower  Middle Income           
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 4.541 3.901 -5.09 9.416 
India South Asia 1.75 4.398 -6.414 9.414 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa 1.238 3.582 -3.54 1.083 
Morocco Middle East & North Africa 6.851 2.612 -1.914 7.853 
Philippines East Asia & Pacific 9.229 3.796 -6.16 7.152 
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia 1.67 6.368 -8.225 1.703 
Pakistan South Asia 1.825 3.931 -6.192 1.12 
Panel B: Upper Middle Income 
 
    
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 9.598 3.077 -4.171 5.61 
Thailand East Asia & Pacific 1.19 5.127 -7.876 1.472 
Tunisia Middle East & North Africa 1.911 2.19 -4.702 4.793 
Turkey Europe & Central Asia 3.029 7.848 -6.24 2.545 
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean 1.717 5.054 -5.717 1.251 
China East Asia & Pacific 1.471 4.53 -5.27 1.022 
Mexico Latin America & Caribbean 1.559 3.375 -4.507 7.85 
Panel C: High Income  
  
 
  Australia East Asia & Pacific 9.412 2.651 -5.408 7.237
Belgium Europe & Central Asia 9.542 3.132 -6.557 6.383 
Canada North America 1.035 2.564 -4.904 5.753 
Germany Europe & Central Asia 1.127 2.696 -4.28 6.403 
Chile Latin America & Caribbean 8.848 3.511 -4.124 8.399 
Israel Middle East & North Africa 
9.269 3.138 -3.468 7.376 
United States North America 8.347 1.874 -3.848 3.101 
United Kingdom Europe & Central Asia 5.337 2.026 -4.952 3.525 
Japan East Asia & Pacific 4.205 2.708 -3.486 5.672 
 
 
3.2 Global risk factors and Governance data 
 
Whereas the country’s credit ratings were collected from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), quality of governance (QG) indicators were also obtained from Political Risk Services 
Inc. (PRS) published by the Country Risk Services Inc. (CRS). The quality of governance (QG) 
gives a measure of the host country’s political environments. The measure includes many 
macro-assessments such as government stability, socioeconomic conditions, external and 
internal conflicts, corruption, law and order, military in politics, religious and ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. To compare and contrast among countries 
with similar stages of economic development, the study divides the sample into three panels. 
The first panel comprises lower middle income (Ghana, India, Nigeria, Morocco, Philippines, 
Pakistan and Ukraine). The second panel includes (South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Brazil, China and Mexico). The last panel considers high income countries (Australia, Belgium, 
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Canada, Germany, Chile, Israel, United States, United Kingdom and Japan). The present study 
seeks to develop country-level governance indices namely voice and accountability (Democracy 
and military in politics), political stability and absence of violence (government stability and 
internal conflict), government effectiveness (Bureaucratic quality), regulatory quality (Investment 
profile), rule of law (Law and order) and control of corruption (Corruption). The choice and 
justification of country selections were motivated by two main criteria. The first of these is the 
number of firms for each country reflects the capital market size with a higher number allocated 
to a country with large capital market size. The second justification is that firms included had 
available and valid data for the analysis of future performance.  
 
3.3 Governance indicators 
 
The study employs six government indicators and these are categorised to measure different 
aspects of governance. The literature on country-level governance indicators as measured by 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption by Low, Kew & Tee (2011) would be 
discussed in turns: 
 
Indicator 1: Voice and Accountability 
 
Voice and Accountability describe how individuals who manage government institutions are 
selected and the stability of their positions in these organizations. Voice and Accountability as 
measured by democracy is not only a complex political and social phenomenon but a subject 
which needs more attention in developing countries and whether democracy can affect the 
behavior of the stock markets still remains unexplored. However, regardless of the connection 
between economic growth and stock market performance, it is possible that democracy and 
political stability might continue to have a direct impact on stock market performance over and 
above their impact on economic growth.  
 
Indicator 2: Political stability and absence of violence 
 
Political stability and absence of violence as measured by government stability and internal 
conflict although are considered as events that do not have any direct relationship with stock 
markets but they are considered as one of the main factors that may affect the stock market’s 
performance. Empirical works by Bittlingmayer (1998), Henry (2000), Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000) and Bailey and Chung (1995) confirm that political uncertainty significantly affects market 
volatility.  
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Indicator 3: Government effectiveness 
 
Government effectiveness as a measure of bureaucratic quality concerns perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the bureaucracy and the reliability of the government's 
responsibility to such guidelines. It considers the ability of the government to formulate, initiate 
and implement sound policies. This index measures the ability of governments to produce and 
implement good policies and deliver public goods. The expanding and improving stock markets 
in developing countries demonstrate an important concern of how government frameworks 
affect stock market performance. Governance quality has been adopted by an international 
organization to measure the state of developing countries.  
 
Indicator 4: Regulatory Quality Index 
 
Regulatory Quality Index which measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
Kaufmann et al. (2009). Regulatory Quality looks at the instances of market-unfavorable 
guidelines such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the 
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas. Low et al, (2011) examine the link between 
country-level governance and global stock market returns and find the regulatory quality is 
positively and significantly related to stock market returns.  
 
Indicator 5: Rule of law 
 
Rule of law selected as our fifth indicator of the study which measures the law and order reflect 
the extent to which citizens of a country has confidence in the courts, the police, the level of 
contract administration and the tendency of  crime and violence. Rule of law is an assessment 
of the law and order tradition in the country. It summarizes in broad terms the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern their interactions. Rule of law considers the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and, more importantly, the enforceability of 
contracts and proprietary rights. This indicator is a proxy for the success of a society in 
developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and 
social interactions. The Raw of law indicator can be considered as a measure of investor 
protection arising from the enforcement of equitable principles. Chiou et al, (2010) using data on 
4916 stocks from 37 countries, confirm equities found in countries practicing English common 
law often have higher risk premium than equities found in countries practicing civil law. The 
qualities of judicial system, legal protection of investors' rights, and the social/political 
environment in a state have significant association on return and risk. Various research studies 
have confirmed the association between performance of financial systems and comprehensive 
legal protection and an efficient legal system both at the macroeconomic and firm levels and 
notable among these studies are La Porta et al. (1998; 2000).  
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Indicator 6: Corruption 
 
Corruption is the extent to which public power is exercised for private interest. Corruption is not 
just about bribery. Instead, corruption extends beyond bribery to include other exercises of 
discretionary power in the public sector. In the academic literature, corruption is often defined as 
the misuse of public office for private gains (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Klitgaard, 1991; 
Transparency International, 1995). The World Bank calls corruption ‘‘the single greatest 
obstacle to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule 
of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends’’. 
Corruption is a serious social problem that affects all facets of a society (Qing et al, 2015). Lee 
and Ng (2004) document the empirical relationship between the level of corruption within a 
country and the valuation of its corporations to shareholders. They find that firms from more 
corrupt countries trade at significantly lower market multiples, after controlling for other factors. 
They document that corruption significantly decreases equity values after controlling for many 
other firms- and country-level control factors. Gelos and Wei (2006) show that lower country 
transparency is associated with lower investment from international funds. They also find that 
during financial crises, international funds flee non-transparent countries by a greater amount 
than their transparent counterparts. Given the link between secrecy and corruption mentioned 
earlier, it seems that corrupted countries will receive less investment from foreign investors.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
To estimate the relationship between governance quality and stock market performance, a 
model for the empirical investigation takes the following form: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  [1] + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,    
 
where Equity Index (EQIND) being the dependent variable, the study regressed all six 
explanatory variables namely Voice and Accountability (VACC), Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence (PSAV), Government Effectiveness (GEFF), Regulatory Quality (RQUA), Rule of 
Law (ROL) and Control of Corruption (COC) on the dependent variable. Other control variables 
include Inflation(INF) and Gross Domestic Product(GDP). The model was also specified 
separately for the various income classes (high income, upper middle income and lower middle 
income). Fixed effect estimation is used in this study in order to include the country fixed effects 
that are largely unobserved in standard econometric models such as the strength of democracy. 
The fixed effect model has chosen ahead of a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
Both fixed effect and random effect estimations were done for all the models, after which a 
Hausman specification test was conducted. The null hypothesis that individual effects are not 
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correlated with any of the model’s regressors was rejected (Hausman, 1978). Thus with 
systematic differences in the coefficients, a fixed effect model was adjudged more appropriate, 
hence the choice of fixed effect estimation. 
Fixed effect estimation is used in this study in order to include the country fixed effects that 
are largely unobserved in standard econometric models such as the strength of democracy. The 
fixed effect model has chosen ahead of a pooled OLS regression. Both fixed effect and random 
effect estimations were done for all the models, after which a Hausman specification test was 
conducted. The null hypothesis that individual effects are not correlated with any of the model’s 
regressors was rejected (Hausman, 1978). Thus with systematic differences in the coefficients, 
a fixed effect model was adjudged more appropriate, hence the choice of fixed effect estimation. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the equity indices for each country from 1996 through to 
2014. Five countries, namely Belgium, China, Australia, Nigeria and South Africa have the  
highest positive equity indices (>9%) with the lowest being Brazil (1.035) during the sample 
period and correspond with a political risk index of each country exceeding 50 per cent. These 
results contradict the findings of Bekaert and Harvey (2000, 2003) and Henry (2000) using IFC 
indices, and found poor stock performance. There are several causes of the better 
performances in these countries. First, these countries have now come out of a long-term 
economic recession and depreciation in the domestic currencies cause a positive return in 
equity markets. This is particularly true for some market like China. Second, the selection of 
sample period excludes major market crashes in a number of states such like “Tequila Crisis” in 
1994, “Asian Flu” in 1997, and “Russian Virus” in 1998. Third, in recent years, an increase in 
integration of the global financial market and financial liberation has increased the abnormal 
returns particularly in less developed markets. The countries of the highest stock return volatility 
are Turkey (7.848) and Pakistan (6.368). This could be attributed to the recent turmoil in the 
region. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the equity indices for each country, categorized 
by sub regions and income classifications mainly lower middle countries (Panel A), Upper 
Middle Income Panel (B) and High Income (Panel C). Of the eight countries sampled within the 
lower middle countries, Philippians showed the highest, positive equity indices and exceeds 9 
per cent with less than 2 per cent for countries such as India, Ukraine, Pakistan and Nigeria. 
Within the upper middle-income countries, South Africa records the highest equity indices with 
Turkey recording the highest stock return volatility. 
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Table 4. Definition of variables and summary statistics. 
Variable Definition obs. mean s.d. min max 
EQIND Equity Indices 437 11.43 38.59 -82.25 254.5 
VACC Voice and Accountability 437 0.62 0.33 0 1 
PSAV Political Stability and Absence of Violence 437 0.59 0.28 0 0.936 
GEFF Government Effectiveness 437 0.59 0.35 0 1 
RQUA Regulatory Quality 437 0.60 0.32 0 1 
ROL Rule of Law 437 0.57 0.32 0 1 
COC Control of Corruption 437 0.42 0.26 0 1 
INF Inflation 437 17.86 7.42 8.58 40.5 
GDP GDP Growth Rate 437 6.36 2.54 3.7 15.00 
 
 
 
Table 4 provides variable definition and summary descriptive statistics for the equity indices 
indicating each countries stock market performance and governance indicators for the entire 
study period of 1996 through to 2014. The data employed had a total of 437 observations. The 
mean of the governance indicators should by definition be zero due to the standardization 
process in their construction. However, the sample of countries selected based on the 
availability of stock market data results in a positive mean for each of the governance indicators. 
On government indicators, Voice and Accountability (VACC) had the highest positive average 
score, followed by Regulatory Quality (RQUA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
(PSAV), Government Effectiveness (GEFF), Rule of Law (ROL), and Control of Corruption 
(COC). Overall, with the exception of EQIND which had its standard deviation higher than its 
mean, all the variables had their means higher than their standard deviation. This depicts close 
spread and high quality of the data. The two macro level control variables exhibited good data 
qualities by showing the low spread in the distribution (with very low standard deviation 
compared to their means). As shown in Table 5, the results of unit root tests indicated that the 
three tests employed (Harris-Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000) and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003)) all 
rejected the null hypothesis of the presence of unit roots in all panels at 1 percent. All the 
variables used are therefore stationary and appropriate carrying out the panel estimation. 
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Table 5. Unit root tests. 
Variable Test 
 
Harris- 
Tzavalis Breitung 
Im-Pesaran- 
Shin 
EQIND -0.1951*** -12.6534*** -10.6018*** 
VACC -0.0693*** -10.6741*** -9.6484*** 
PSAV -0.3124*** -11.6705*** -12.2565*** 
GEFF -0.1848*** -9.9423*** -11.2918*** 
RQUA -0.1376*** -9.5214*** -8.1813*** 
ROL -0.3114*** -10.2534*** -12.3119*** 
COC -0.2047*** -10.0288*** -11.5573*** 
INF -0.2373*** -10.7468*** -11.3411*** 
GDP -0.1822*** -9.4428*** -10.2082*** 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots Ha: At least one panel is stationary 
 
 
Table 6 summarizes the statistics of quality governance indicators from 1996 to 2014. 
Quality of governance (QG) indicators used in this study, which have been obtained from 
Political Risk Services Inc. (PRS) and published by the Country Risk Services Inc. (CRS), 
includes voice and accountability (Democracy and military in politics), political stability and 
absence of violence (government stability and internal conflict), government effectiveness 
(Bureaucratic quality), regulatory quality (Investment profile), rule of law (Law and order), and 
control of corruption (Corruption). 
 
5.2 Model results 
 
From Table 7, Voice and accountability (VACC) had a positive impact on EQIND, and the 
impact was significant at the 1 per cent level. This implies that the countries with higher voice 
and accountability rates are likely to have increased equity indices, and the opposite also holds. 
Stated differently, the improvements in democracy lead to higher returns. Whereas the findings 
confirm the results of Lehkonen & Heimonen, (2015), they contradict the results of (Low et al, 
2011). Regulatory Quality (RQUA) considers instances of market-unfavorable guidelines i.e. 
weak bank oversight and surveillance had a positive and significant impact on EQIND at the 5 
per cent level. This shows that an improvement in regulatory quality results in an increased 
equity index, and vice versa. Such results parallel those of Albuquerque and Wang (2008) 
findings suggest that high investments are often necessitated by poor investor protection and 
support those of Harvey (1995), Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) with special reference to 
emerging markets.  
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Table 6. Summary statistics of quality governance indicators. 
 
Voice & Accountability Political Stability & Absence of Violence Government Effectiveness 
Market mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max 
Panel A: Lower  Middle Income         
Ghana 0.695 0.310 0.000 0.830 0.485 0.220 0.000 0.670 0.632 0.281 0.000 0.750 
India 0.365 0.178 0.000 0.500 0.477 0.223 0.000 0.740 0.211 0.125 0.000 0.500 
Nigeria 0.365 0.178 0.000 0.500 0.477 0.223 0.000 0.740 0.211 0.125 0.000 0.500 
Morocco 0.586 0.269 0.000 0.750 0.633 0.289 0.000 0.840 0.421 0.187 0.000 0.500 
Philippines 0.598 0.269 0.000 0.830 0.601 0.276 0.000 0.870 0.618 0.281 0.000 0.750 
Ukraine 0.618 0.344 0.000 0.880 0.560 0.300 0.000 0.840 0.197 0.105 0.000 0.250 
Pakistan 0.246 0.215 0.000 0.710 0.473 0.243 0.000 0.780 0.434 0.201 0.000 0.750 
Panel B: Upper Middle Income         
South Africa 0.680 0.305 0.000 0.830 0.601 0.269 0.000 0.790 0.434 0.201 0.000 0.750 
Thailand 0.526 0.245 0.000 0.710 0.572 0.278 0.000 0.910 0.434 0.201 0.000 0.750 
Tunisia 0.430 0.198 0.000 0.710 0.705 0.322 0.000 0.900 0.421 0.187 0.000 0.500 
Turkey 0.500 0.264 0.000 0.830 0.501 0.231 0.000 0.720 0.421 0.205 0.000 0.750 
Brazil 0.614 0.277 0.000 0.750 0.610 0.273 0.000 0.780 0.434 0.201 0.000 0.750 
China 0.288 0.135 0.000 0.380 0.657 0.303 0.000 0.900 0.421 0.187 0.000 0.500 
Mexico 0.686 0.313 0.000 0.880 0.580 0.262 0.000 0.820 0.612 0.279 0.000 0.750 
Panel C:High Income         
Australia 0.842 0.375 0.000 1.000 0.647 0.292 0.000 0.940 0.842 0.375 0.000 1.000 
Belgium 0.834 0.372 0.000 1.000 0.646 0.291 0.000 0.890 0.842 0.375 0.000 1.000 
Canada 0.838 0.373 0.000 1.000 0.641 0.287 0.000 0.820 0.641 0.287 0.000 0.820 
Germany 0.819 0.366 0.000 1.000 0.666 0.302 0.000 0.910 0.842 0.375 0.000 1.000 
Chile 0.618 0.286 0.000 0.790 0.647 0.295 0.000 0.930 0.632 0.281 0.000 0.750 
Israel 0.613 0.275 0.000 0.830 0.408 0.187 0.000 0.570 0.836 0.373 0.000 1.000 
United States 0.727 0.328 0.000 1.000 0.648 0.292 0.000 0.840 0.842 0.375 0.000 1.000 
United Kingdom 0.838 0.373 0.000 1.000 0.591 0.270 0.000 0.840 0.842 0.375 0.000 1.000 
Japan 0.727 0.327 0.000 1.000 0.683 0.310 0.000 0.910 0.836 0.373 0.000 1.000 
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Table 6 (cont.). Summary statistics of quality governance indicators. 
 
 Regulatory quality Rule of law Control of corruption 
Market mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max 
Panel A: Lower  Middle Income         
Ghana 0.518 0.256 0.000 0.770 0.564 0.251 0.000 0.670 0.344 0.167 0.000 0.500 
India 0.361 0.181 0.000 0.550 0.292 0.150 0.000 0.500 0.194 0.096 0.000 0.330 
Nigeria 0.361 0.181 0.000 0.550 0.292 0.150 0.000 0.500 0.194 0.096 0.000 0.330 
Morocco 0.599 0.281 0.000 0.770 0.722 0.332 0.000 1.000 0.395 0.184 0.000 0.500 
Philippines 0.590 0.274 0.000 0.820 0.361 0.186 0.000 0.670 0.310 0.164 0.000 0.670 
Ukraine 0.375 0.225 0.000 0.640 0.529 0.281 0.000 0.670 0.232 0.145 0.000 0.500 
Pakistan 0.401 0.234 0.000 0.730 0.443 0.204 0.000 0.670 0.266 0.131 0.000 0.500 
Panel B: Upper Middle Income         
South Africa 0.646 0.311 0.000 0.910 0.348 0.175 0.000 0.670 0.378 0.197 0.000 0.830 
Thailand 0.528 0.250 0.000 0.730 0.440 0.258 0.000 0.830 0.262 0.130 0.000 0.500 
Tunisia 0.545 0.263 0.000 0.820 0.699 0.311 0.000 0.830 0.337 0.166 0.000 0.500 
Turkey 0.498 0.241 0.000 0.820 0.571 0.264 0.000 0.750 0.335 0.158 0.000 0.500 
Brazil 0.476 0.224 0.000 0.640 0.293 0.143 0.000 0.500 0.382 0.202 0.000 0.670 
China 0.480 0.227 0.000 0.820 0.596 0.277 0.000 0.830 0.271 0.138 0.000 0.420 
Mexico 0.673 0.315 0.000 0.950 0.319 0.165 0.000 0.500 0.310 0.164 0.000 0.670 
Panel C:High Income          
Australia 0.746 0.360 0.000 1.000 0.800 0.358 0.000 1.000 0.661 0.296 0.000 0.830 
Belgium 0.674 0.326 0.000 0.950 0.708 0.317 0.000 1.000 0.587 0.279 0.000 0.830 
Canada 0.780 0.372 0.000 1.000 0.817 0.365 0.000 1.000 0.709 0.327 0.000 1.000 
Germany 0.765 0.358 0.000 1.000 0.717 0.323 0.000 1.000 0.674 0.304 0.000 0.830 
Chile 0.749 0.342 0.000 0.950 0.678 0.304 0.000 0.830 0.580 0.277 0.000 0.750 
Israel 0.647 0.305 0.000 0.820 0.699 0.311 0.000 0.830 0.468 0.224 0.000 0.830 
United States 0.808 0.366 0.000 1.000 0.726 0.329 0.000 1.000 0.581 0.265 0.000 0.830 
United Kingdom 0.762 0.353 0.000 1.000 0.777 0.351 0.000 1.000 0.615 0.279 0.000 0.830 
Japan 0.737 0.362 0.000 1.000 0.717 0.323 0.000 1.000 0.516 0.261 0.000 0.830 
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Rule of law (ROL), which reflects the extent to which citizens of a country have 
confidence in the courts, the police, the level of contract administration and the tendency of 
crime and violence, interestingly is seen to affect EQIND rather negatively at 5 per cent level of 
significance. Thus, countries with higher ratings of rule of law were seen to have lower equity 
indices. The trustworthiness of governments, the reliability of courts, and the full disclosures of 
accounting standards in the countries of the common law system significantly affect stock 
market returns (Djankov et al., 2003). La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) report that the countries with 
English common law origin provide the strongest legal protection to investors. Our empirical 
results confirm that risk and performance of a financial asset are related to the tradition of 
commercial law in a country. The stocks in the countries with French/Spanish civil law origin are 
the most volatile. The result validates the study hypothesis. Control of corruption (COC) has a 
negative relation with EQIND at 10 per cent level of significance. This implies that the more 
countries focused on reducing or controlling corruption, the more they scored in terms of their 
equity index. Various studies which support this result include the work of Mauro (1995) which 
affirms that corruption leads to lower levels of investment and growth. Wei (1997) finds that 
corrupted countries attract less foreign direct investment. The presence of corruption reduces 
investors’ confidence in the rules that guide their businesses and thus boost investors’ risks of 
dealing in such financial market. (Ng, 2006). 
 
Table 7. Regression results from fixed effects estimation. 
VARIABLES Equity Indices 
VACC 1.3737*** 
 
(0.2984) 
PSAV 3.0881 
 
(2.8966) 
GEFF -2.0337 
 
(2.1716) 
RQUA 0.6989** 
 
(.2911) 
ROL -3.7122*** 
 
(0.4282) 
COC 0.6552* 
 
(0.2992) 
INF -4.4678 
 (4.2992) 
GDPG 1.6062*** 
 (0.0454) 
CONSTANT 5.8404*** 
  (1.5331) 
Observations 437 
Adj. R-squared 0.2392 
Hausman 61.33 
Prob > F 0.0000 
F(8, 430) 144.25 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Note. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
Table 8 presents the results of fixed effect estimation, by grouping the observations into 
three: higher income, upper middle income and lower middle income countries. Voice and 
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accountability (VACC) had a negative impact on EQIND in high income and lower middle 
income countries, and these impacts were significant at the 1 per cent and 10 per cent levels 
respectively. The implication is that, for both high income and lower middle income countries, an 
increase in voice and accountability would result in reduced equity indices. For the high income 
states, political stability and absence of violence (PSAV) had a positive impact on EQIND at the 
5 per cent significance level. However, it was not significant for the other income classes. 
Interestingly, government effectiveness (GEFF) had a significantly negative impact on EQIND 
among the high income countries at 5 per cent level of significance, but also had a 5 per cent 
significant positive impact among the lower middle income class of countries. Thus, an 
improvement in government effectiveness would reduce equity indices in high income states 
and increase equity indices in lower middle income states. Although regulatory quality (RQUA) 
had no significant impact on EQIND among both high and upper middle income countries, the 
impact was positive and significant among the lower middle income countries at the 5 per cent 
level. Thus, lower income countries would benefit significantly from improvement in regulatory 
quality. ROL had a significant positive impact on EQIND among the upper middle income and 
high income countries at 5 per cent and 10 per cent respective levels of significance, but also 
had a 1 per cent significant negative impact among the lower middle income class of countries. 
Thus, an improvement in government effectiveness would increase equity indices in high 
income states but will reduce equity indices in lower middle income states. COC had a 
significant positive impact on EQIND among the upper middle income countries at 1 per cent 
level of significance. 
 
Table 8. Regression results from fixed effects estimations. 
 
 
 
  INCOME CLASS 
VARIABLES High income Upper-middle income Lower-middle income 
VACC -0.7635*** -0.8864 -0.8250*** 
 
(0.1217) (0.5352) (0.0259) 
PSAV 3.2525* 2.1666 1.6656 
 
(1.5180) (5.2712) (3.1173) 
GEFF 0.8569** -0.8249 -0.9343** 
 
(0.3622) (0.4556) (0.3931) 
RQUA 2.9788 0.7375 0.8054*** 
 
(2.0091) (0.9843) (0.2248) 
ROL - 0.6156*** 1.0025** 0.7268* 
 
(0.2055) (0.5118) (0.3505) 
COC 0.7360 0.4252*** 0.5524 
 
(0.5684) (0.0575) 0.3979 
INF 0.0347 0.6248 0.0257 
 (0.3468) (0.4972) (0.1685) 
GDP 0.5256* 0.6787** 0.4674*** 
 (0.2566) (0.2088) (0.0467) 
CONSTANT -1.7959 -1.0238 -0.9171 
  (1.7588) (1.0737) (0.5846) 
Observations 171 133 133 
Adj. R-squared 0.1754 0.2255 0.2712 
Hausman 77.0535 77.0535 77.0535 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
F-Statistic 95.47 100.85 108.43 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note. *** p<0.01,;** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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6. Discussion and implications 
 
The sample employed in this study comprised of 23 countries with complete relevant data for 
the period from 1996 and 2014. The data is collected from different sources. The global equity 
indices were obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators DataStream and are 
broadly representative of each country’s market composition to investigate the relation between 
quality of governance and stock market performance within the context of international markets 
using a fixed effect model. The study reveals that quality of governance as captured by Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption significantly affect stock market 
performance. Varying effects are produced when the countries are decomposed into income 
classifications. What is more, the findings and suggestions of this study suggest that quality of 
government significantly affect foreign direct investment and could have interesting policy 
implications. Such examination of the relation between quality of governance and stock market 
performance using most recent data is a contribution to empirical literature. From the findings of 
the study, the authors recommend the strategic managerial and policy implications that follow. 
 
Managerial Implication 
 
The results of this study offer some strategic implications for Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), financial institutions and financial consulting firms. First and foremost the 
results demonstrate that quality of governance is statistically significant with stock market 
performance, consistent with Hooper et al. (2009). This indicates that strong stock market 
performance is largely a result of an efficient institutional environment. Besides, investors who 
are not risk lovers would like to invest in countries with mean-variance efficiency. This shows 
that the quality of governance lowers both transaction and agency costs and creates value for 
shareholders. The result of this paper incorporates various positions of the world business 
literature from different perspectives i.e. the call for institutional reforms, standardized rules and 
regulation (Clark, 2003), especially a revitalization of regulation (Ngugi, 2003), since a tight 
regulation will lead to greater market efficiency and low volatility (Mutenheri and Green, 2003). 
Furthermore, corruption remains dire in the continent and represents a significant risk to 
financial market development. Therefore as a policy recommendation to the governments of the 
sampled countries especially maintain sound regulation quality and respect for the rule of law 
(Bartels et al., 2009; Toumi, 2011; Darley, 2012). Measures should be put in place in African 
countries to avoid violence and political instability. 
 
Policy Implication 
 
The results of` this study have some policy implications for governments of various markets and 
other regulators. Many stock markets found in the lower middle income countries within the 
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Sub-Saharan African particularly in the French speaking countries are taking too long to pick-up. 
Regulatory environment and institutional arrangements significantly influence stock market 
development. Unfortunately, these unique arrangements have been discounted; therefore, 
policies that improve the condition of the political environment of a country should be pursued 
moderately since it has an important impact on the equity market. The findings of this study 
highlight the importance of the political dimension and thus imply that political reform deserves 
urgent policy attention in countries with weak political structures. These surely deserve attention 
in future research.  
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